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Abstract—Contemporary vehicles offer an advanced telematics
platform with multiple applications available such as electronic
road tolling, emergency call, breakdown call, or route planning.
Given the sensitivity of collected driver and vehicle data and the
potential use of this data by third party applications, security
mechanisms are needed to protect services as well as data. Al-
though security has been investigated in recent telematics studies,
they do not consider potentially malicious or erroneous third
party applications. This paper presents a secure multi-application
platform that is designed as a modular software architecture
with security features to support availability, confidentiality and
integrity; a proof-of-concept prototype was developed on state-
of-the-art hardware and software.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent vehicles offer a on-board telematics platform that
not only controls functional features (e.g. automated break, or
slip control) [1], but also provides a platform for applications
to regulate and protect drivers (e.g. electronic road tolling (e-
toll), emergency call (e-call), breakdown call) and a wide range
of infotainment applications (e.g. traffic information service,
video/radio streaming service, or route planner) [2].
Current research typically focuses on single applications.
In reality however, all proposed applications co-operate in
a limited and shared environment on a common telematics
platform, and multiple independent parties are interested to use
the data collected by such a platform. Although some research
has investigated multi-application platforms, it focuses on
applications with uniform requirements without addressing
intrinsic security issues.
In this paper, we use the case of e-toll to illustrate that (1)
the functional requirement of independent access to vehicle
data is strong, and (2) non-functional requirements, such as
security or privacy, are equally important. The concept of e-toll
implies that road charging is based on the time and route driven
instead of a flat fee based on car parameters or total mileage. In
order to achieve this, the route is electronically monitored by
a GPS tracker; journey information is then locally processed
into an amount of toll due, or directly transmitted to the proper
authorities to perform remote processing.
Other applications are equally interested in using the col-
lected e-toll data to create new services. For example, a pay-as-
you-drive insurance application that calculates insurance fees
based on time and type of roads used, or an on-board payment
application that allows the driver or a passenger to pay toll fees
immediately after a trip.
The e-toll application also illustrates the need for three
security measures: it must be running at all times (availability),
it must collect and process sensitive journey data (confiden-
tiality), and this data must be protected from tampering or
unauthorized access (integrity) by other applications or parties,
including the user.
The contribution of this paper is the definition and reali-
sation of software architecture for a multi-application vehicle
platform that addresses the three security requirements (avail-
ability, confidentiality, integrity). The architecture defines three
features: (1) the separation between a Core Runtime Environ-
ment (CRE) and a Service Runtime Environment (SRE), (2)
a Local Entity Access Control (LEAC) for the SRE, and (3) a
Remote Entity Access Control (REAC) for the CRE and SRE.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II positions the architecture of this paper in the wider GST ar-
chitecture. Section III presents the three security requirements
and relates them to the most relevant involved parties. Section
IV presents the architecture of our secure multi-application
platform. Section V evaluates a proof of concept prototype of
the architecture. Section VI positions our work in the field
of telematics software platforms and compares our solution to
OSGi and the GST architecture. Section VII summarizes the
main contributions in this paper and highlights future work.
II. REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
We position the proposed multi-application platform in the
GST reference architecture for telematics [3] (see Figure
1). This architecture enables remote management of vehicle
applications by a trusted party, the Host Management Center
(HMC). We assume that vehicle manufacturers provide users
with a platform to install and update applications. Additionally
this would allow them to remotely manage functional software.
Field upgradability is an increasingly important feature. In
December 2009, Toyota had to recall several types of cars due
to faulty brake software. Toyota estimated a loss of 2 billion
dollars due to costs and lost sales from the recall [4].
Service Centers provide applications to the HMC; the HMC
is responsible for verification of the software and deployment
on to the vehicle platform. Due to the potential amount of
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Fig. 1. Distributed reference architecture of the multi-application platform.
programs, this verification is automated. It is very unlikely that
this static filter detects all erroneous or malicious programs.
Some malicious or erroneous programs could be installed onto
vehicle platforms.
Vehicle applications may need additional services from the
Internet. For example, a traffic information application has a
local component on the vehicle that informs the driver that
updated traffic conditions can be downloaded; these additional
services are also provided by a Service Center.
III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
We identify three security requirements (availability, con-
fidentiality and integrity) to be supported by the vehicle
telematics platform and describe their role for different stake-
holders involved: users, the government as third party service
provider, and the HMC as management center. We apply the
three security requirements on the applications installed on
the platform, and two of them (confidentiality and integrity)
on the data present on the platform.
 Availability of applications: Mandatory applications
(e.g. e-toll, crash prevention) must have guarantees on the
availability and timeliness of their operation, which will
be required by law; infotainment applications (e.g. traffic
information) may only require a best effort availability.
Users however depend on the availability of certain
infotainment services for guiding them and experience
any downtime as a significant inconvenience.
 Confidentiality of applications: No application should
be able to see which other applications are running on
the application platform. An application should only be
able to access and view those services it requires.
 Integrity of applications: Applications need to be pro-
tected from illegal modifications. It must be prevented
that any party, including the user, can illegally alter any
application. Government required applications will re-
quire by law to be protected from such modifications. The
HMC is responsible for the component composition on
the platform and must enforce correct and incorruptible
operational conditions at all times.
 Confidentiality of data: Data must be protected from
unauthorized access by third party applications. Users do
not want that sensitive data on the vehicle can be read
by non-authorized parties. The government requires that
privacy sensitive information is adequately protected from
malicious parties.
 Integrity of data: Data must be protected from illegal
modifications. No party or application, including the user,
should be able to modify any data it is not allowed to
modify. For example users should not be able to change
the toll they are due.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
This section presents the software architecture of the secure
application platform. We assume multiple applications are run-
ning on the platform. Each applications consists of components
that implement the functional behaviour of the platform. Ap-
plications can communicate with each other through message
passing. Internet/VANET access and data storage capabilities
are available on the platform.
In order to meet the security requirements, we propose an
architecture with three key features (see Figure 2): (1) the
separation of the platform in two runtime environments, (2) a
Local Entity Access Control (LEAC), and (3) a Remote Entity
Access Control (REAC). The LEAC and REAC are policy
driven. These security policies dictate to which resources
respectively the applications or remote communication entities
have access.
We assume that the platform is managed by the HMC.
The HMC can manage the application platform in two ways.
(1) The HMC can send new or updated applications to the
application platform to provide new or improved functional
behaviour. (2) The HMC can send new or updated security
policies to the application platform to change the security
enforcement of the platform. The HMC can manage the
applications and policies by sending the new data to the
Application Management or Policy Management application
on the application platform.
A. Separation of runtimes
The first feature of the architecture is the separation of the
multi-application platform in two separated platforms with
independent hardware and runtime environments. The Core
Runtime Environment (CRE) runs security critical or manda-
tory applications; the Service Runtime Environment (SRE)
runs optional and non-critical applications.
The separation of runtimes supports the availability, confi-
dentiality and integrity of applications and the integrity and
confidentiality of data. Critical or mandatory applications and
data on the CRE cannot be illegally affected by the SRE. It
also enables the SRE to be more open without affecting the
applications of the CRE.
Each platform has the availability to communicate over
the Internet and over the local VANET through a remote
communication service, and the SRE and CRE can communi-
cate with each other through a local communication service.
All communication over these channels must be encrypted to
preserve the integrity and confidentiality of the data. As we
illustrated, many infotainment applications are interested in
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Fig. 2. Deployment view of the security architecture of the multi-application platform.
certain data collected in the CRE. This inter-runtime commu-
nication should be allowed according to predefined policies in
the LEAC and REAC.
The Core Runtime Environment (CRE) hosts the critical and
mandatory applications. It is a small, controlled and verified
runtime platform in a tamper proof box. This runtime only
hosts thoroughly verified and trusted applications which are
pre-installed; the application composition is static but can be
targeted to the type of vehicle. To reduce cost and increase
integrity of this platform, the CRE will either not be updatable,
or only updatable in a strictly controlled environment with
the highest security standards, for example by a licensed car
dealer.
The Service Runtime Environment (SRE) hosts the optional
and non-critical applications such as infotainment applications.
This environment can be tailored to the preferences of the
user. The user can interact with the applications on the SRE
through a user interface. This runtime hosts applications that
can come from many different service providers and can
therefore not be trusted. New applications can be installed
on this platform at runtime. New applications are required to
pass verification by the HMC before they can be deployed. The
vehicle platform enforces service or user specific policies that
cannot be enforced at verification time (e.g. inter application
communication).
B. Local Entity Access Control (LEAC)
The LEAC is an interception engine that monitors all inter-
application messages and applies access control on these mes-
sages. It contains a list of access policy items which state for
each application which resources it is allowed to communicate
with. The LEAC enforces these access policies. The policy
engine can allow or deny a message from one application to
another, and can log these messages in a database.
The LEAC facilitates the integrity and confidentiality of data
and applications. By limiting the access to resources, appli-
cations can only gather and alter data and perform operations
they are privileged to. Sensitive information and resources are
only accessible to those applications that have received explicit
permission.
The LEAC is only present on the SRE. The first reason is
that possibly malicious or severely erroneous applications can
only be installed on the SRE. The applications on the CRE
are validated and completely trusted, so these do not have to
be protected from one another. The second reason is that the
LEAC causes extra overhead on the platform. For critical and
mandatory applications this overhead needs to be avoided. The
SRE on the other hand does not host critical applications so
additional overhead is acceptable.
The LEAC is managed by the HMC. The HMC provides
and updates the access policies. The user can be allowed to
add additional policies as long as they do not conflict with
policies provided by the HMC.
C. Remote Entity Access Control (REAC)
The REAC is responsible for authentication and authoriza-
tion of incoming communication. Authentication can be done
by having a list of certificates installed on the platforms. Every
incoming message has to be signed to enable verification of
the authenticity of the message. Once the identity of the sender
has been checked, the REAC can activate access policies to
allow or prevent message delivery. The REAC is also able to
log the communication.
The REAC ensures the integrity of the applications and
data by blocking incoming data from unauthorized parties.
Especially the management applications have strict access
limitations: only the HMC should be allowed to send new
applications and new policies to the management applications.
On the CRE, a limited form of the REAC is needed. The
applications are static and only a very limited amount of
entities, which are known in advance, are allowed to send
messages to the CRE. The REAC on the CRE does not have
to change over time; all access policies are static.
On the SRE, the REAC has to be more elaborate. Due to the
dynamic nature of the platform, the parties that are allowed to
send messages to the platform change over time. The access
policies in the REAC also have to change over time. This
configuration is done by the HMC.
V. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed architecture is implemented on top of 2
run-time platforms. The Core Runtime Environment is im-
plemented on an embedded Java CDC based platform. The
Service Runtime Environment is implemented on a standard
telematics platform, the CarPC, running an OSGi platform.
A. Core Runtime Environment (CRE)
The CRE is implemented on the NXP ATOP, an embedded
Java ME CDC based platform. Java has been used for vehicle
monitoring [7] and was chosen for its ease of programming,
its inherent type security and industry wide support. It enables
future evolution to other Java based platforms such as OSGi.
It also allows for fast prototyping of the architecture.
The downside of this choice is the potential negative impact
on performance and the larger binary size, which increases the
cost of the platform. However the measured overhead remains
limited and acceptable.
The current implementation is an event based component
system. Each application is implemented in a component.
These components can register themselves with an event
manager. Components can send events to and receive events
from other components and the SRE. A tolling application
is created that gathers information from a GPS sensor and
calculates the distance and the associated toll fee.
The Java ME CDC platform requires a minimal total storage
memory of 192KB. The event based component system with
communication to the SRE and the Internet requires another
43KB of memory. Additional applications require another few
KB of memory depending on their functionality. For example
the e-toll application requires another 3KB of memory. A
platform with a few MB of memory is enough to support
the CRE. Real-time support and updatability require some
additional memory, but the overhead should be manageable.
B. Service Runtime Environment (SRE)
The SRE is implemented on a standard telematics platform
running a modified version of the Felix OSGi platform [8].
OSGi is a modular multi-application environment. Each
application is packed into a bundle that can separately be
installed, started, stopped, updated and removed. Bundles can
provide services by providing a service registry with a service
interface and an object implementing the interface. Bundles
can consume services of other bundles by requesting the
service object for a service interface. Bundles can be updated
while providing and consuming services of other bundles,
which makes it a very modular and updatable environment.
OSGi is chosen as the platform for prototyping for three
main reasons: (1) it provides a modular abstraction for appli-
cations, (2) it is an industry accepted standard, and (3) the
Java environment allows for easy and fast development of a
prototype. The Felix implementation was chosen because of
its open source implementation which allows us to modify the
Security issue OSGi GST presented architecture
Availability of applications *X
Confidentiality of applications X * *X
Confidentiality of data X *X *X
Integrity of applications *X * *X
Integrity of data X * *X
TABLE I
A COMPARISON BETWEEN A STANDARD OSGI PLATFORM, THE GST
ARCHITECTURE AND OUR PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE.
*: PROTECTED FROM MALICIOUS OUTSIDE PARTIES
X: PROTECTED FROM MALICIOUS APPLICATIONS
platform. The downside to choosing OSGi however are the
few inherent security flaws [5].
The runtime allows for remote installation and removal of
bundles. A gateway to the CRE is implemented. The gateway
translates the Java method calls to events and sends these
events to the CRE. It also processes the events from the CRE
and calls the necessary methods.
The basic Felix OSGi framework has a size of 625KB. This
provides the basic OSGi functionality with a service registry,
bundle repository and a basic shell. For use in a telematics
system, an additional bundle was developed that provides a
graphical user interface and the connection with the CRE.
The overhead of this bundle is an additional 86KB. A tolling
application has been made that shows the current toll on the
user interface together with the current location and an option
to instantly pay the current toll due. This application bundle
has a size of 4KB.
A prototype implementation of the security features is added
to the Felix OSGi framework. Bundles are now only permitted
to import and export services if the bundle’s manifest file
clearly states that the bundle is allowed to import or export
that service. In addition to the access check, the Local Entity
Access Control is implemented by using the proxy design
pattern. The object that a bundle receives when requesting
a service is no longer the object that provides the service but
rather a proxy. This proxy logs each call to the service and
checks whether the call is allowed. An additional bundle is
provided to change the access rights at runtime. These new
features increase the size of the basic framework with 14KB.
VI. RELATED WORK
We position our research in the context of two service plat-
forms that can be used for secure vehicle telematics platforms
(GST and OSGi). First we introduce the two projects, then
we compare the proposed architecture with a standard OSGi
platform and the GST architecture (see Table I).
GST [3] is a European vehicle telematics research project.
One of the sub-projects was concerned with securing tele-
matics systems. They focus on protecting the vehicle platform
against malicious outside parties while assuming that all
applications executing on the vehicle can be trusted. However,
when we consider the amount of telematics applications that
can be installed, we can not make the assumption that these
applications behave as expected when installed on a single
platform. To provide basic security, GST proposes to separate
the execution environment in a standard runtime and a security
module. The security module is responsible for secure data
storage and cryptographic functions such as key agreement,
secure logging and secure random number generation. The
most security critical parts of some programs, such as online
payment, also run in this security module. All other programs
run in a standard runtime environment that interacts with
the security module. However, all applications in the normal
runtime can access the security module. This means that while
the cryptographic keys themselves are not exposed, they can
still be used without authorization.
OSGi is an industry standard for multi-application platforms
that can be used as a telematics platform [5]. Although it
has many advantages such as ease of use and providing
inherent evolvability, key concerns can be identified when
applied to vehicles. OSGi currently supports an adapted Java
2 Security functionality. Each bundle needs the appropriate
Java Permission in order to access a service from the service
registry or the file system. The security architecture is quite
complex and often only partially implemented in the OSGi
implementations. Researchers have investigated the current
security of OSGi and concluded there are still significant
weaknesses present on the platform [6]. Also, OSGi does not
inherently offer any networking functionality.
Availability of applications: All OSGi applications typi-
cally run on a single platform, with no RAM or thread control.
Any bundle can consume unlimited memory or spawn an
infinite amount of threads, destroying the availability of the
applications. GST does not mention any protection to guaran-
tee availability for applications. In our solution, critical appli-
cations are executed in a separated and trusted environment.
This prevents any malicious application from interrupting the
operation of the platform or any critical application.
Confidentiality of applications: in OSGi, a bundle can
only see those services it has permission to. GST does not
mention any way to protect application confidentiality. It
does protect resources from outside interference however. Our
system protects application confidentiality by restricting access
of resources to only those applications that have permissions.
Confidentiality of data: OSGi supports internal data con-
fidentiality. Services are only accessible when having the re-
quired permission. GST protects critical data by storing it in a
separated security module. Other data is only protected against
outsider attacks. Our architecture ensures data confidentiality
by restricting access. Only authorized applications or outside
parties can query confidential resources and only they have
access to the confidential data.
Integrity of applications: OSGi protects the integrity of the
platform by a system of bundle signing, where only certified
bundles can be installed on to the OSGi platform. GST verifies
authenticity of incoming data so an unauthorized outsider
cannot change the platform. Our platform restricts the usage
of the management applications to only those parties that are
authorized to use the management applications. Only the HMC
is allowed to interact with the management applications.
Integrity of data: OSGi provides integrity of data from
internal attack by restricting the use of services with Java
Permissions. GST protects the data from outsider attack by
authorizing incoming requests. We protect the most critical
data by storing it in on the secured platform, and protect other
data by authorizing any request on a resource.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a dual runtime environment architec-
ture to enhance the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of critical and mandatory applications while still providing
an open platform for infotainment applications. The Core
Runtime Environment (CRE) hosts the mandatory applications
separated from the Service Runtime Environment (SRE) which
can host an endless variety of infotainment applications. A
connection between the two runtimes allows applications on
the SRE to make use of the data on the CRE. The SRE is
updatable to allow the platform to evolve in order to meet
future changes. Additionally a Local Entity Access Control
and a Remote Entity Access Control have been introduced to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the applications and
data on the platforms. A proof of concept was implemented
that demonstrates the feasibility of the architecture.
The architecture only offers a mechanism to enforce poli-
cies. However, a point of interest is how to create and manage
a consistent and non-conflicting set of policies based on
government, HMC and Service Center requirements and the
wishes of the multiple users of the car.
At the moment we only assume communication over the In-
ternet. Yet vehicles will also communicate with other vehicles
and road-side infrastructure. Another point of interest is how
we can securely provide and consume services to the other
vehicles or the infrastructure.
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